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Abstract:  Both in developed and developing countries, governments of all levels pay much 
attention to the weak industry----agriculture and try their best to find out the effective way to 
develop it. Cleaner production in agriculture is the effective way to realize sustainable development 
in China. According to the behavioral features of local governments and the actuality of agriculture 
development, the thesis holds that the realization of agricultural cleaner production depends on the 
interest games between economic bodies and perfect market system. Besides, set up the operation 
mechanism for agricultural products and factor markets will help the development of cleaner 
production. Local governments allocate the resources by controlling all kinds of markets. The 
thesis mainly discusses the local governments’ behavior models based on factor markets. Adjust the 
farmers’ production behaviors with the constraints of capital, lands, labor and so on. Optimize 
combination between multi-items. Local governments will influence farmers’ choice by changing 
their production functions. The thesis also analyzes how can local governments accelerate the 
process of agricultural cleaner production and improve competitive power in local areas by 
influencing the management environment of agricultural products’ producers. 
Key words: Local governments, Factor markets, Target functions 
 
Résumé: Tant dans les pays développés que dans les pays en développement, les gouvernement de 
toutes les échelles prêtent attention à l’industrie faible --- agriculture, et font leur possible pour 
trouver le moyen efficace du développement agricole. La production propre dans l’agriculture est 
une voie efficace pour réaliser le développement durable en Chine. Selon les caractéristiques 
comportementales des gouvernements locaux et l’actualité du développement agricole, le présent 
essai pense que la réalisation de production propre agricole dépend du jeu d’intérêt entre les corps 
économiques et du système parfait du marché. En plus, instituer le mécanisme opérationnel pour les 
produits agricoles et les marchés de facteur aidera au développement de la production propre. Les 
gouvernements distribuent les ressources en contrôlant toutes sortes de marchés. L’article traite 
essentiellement les modèles comportementaux des gouvernements locaux basés sur les marchés de 
facteur : ajuster les comportements productifs des paysans avec les contraintes de capital, de terre, 
de labeur, etc ; optimiser la combinaison de multi-articles. Les gouvernements locaux vont 
influencer le choix des paysans en changeant leurs fonctions de production. L’article analyse aussi 
comment les gouvernements locaux peuvent accélérer le processus de la production propre agricole 
et élever la compétitivité dans des régions locales en influençant l’environnement de management 
des producteurs agricoles. 
Mots-Clés: gouvernements locaux, marché de facteur, fonctions cible 
 
                                                        
1 Tackling key subjects in Heilongjiang province: Countermeasures study on cycle forest foods certification and industrialization in 
Heilongjiang Province（GC05D211） 
Heilongjiang Education Department projects: Study on cycle agricultural development mode and evaluation index system in 
Heilongjiang （11513019） 
Heilongjiang philosophy and social funds project: Support mechanism study on cycle economy of Medium and Small Enterprises in 
Heilongjiang （06D021） 
2 School of Economics and Management, Northeast Forestry University, China. 
* Received 20 October 2007;  accepted 15 December 2007 
Chen Hong/Canadian Social Science Vol.4 No.1 2008 1-7 
 2 
 
In 16th CPC report, to construct modern agriculture is 
the new mission, new target and new requirement of 
developing agriculture in the new stage. Agricultural 
cleaner production is the new agricultural production. 
By adopting advanced technologies, making good use 
of natural resources and agricultural chemicals, it 
provides pollution-free agricultural products, which can 
guarantee people’s health. Meanwhile, the reduction 
and reuse of the agricultural wastes in the production 
keep the ecological equilibrium and realize the 
sustainable development. It is the product of enhanced 
global environment consciousness, the direction and 
trend of developing agriculture in the 21st century. 
China is a big agricultural country, to accelerate the 
development of agricultural cleaner production is the 
important and ear gent mission.  
The key factor of developing agricultural cleaner 
production is to set up the operation mechanism of 
agricultural products and factor markets in cleaning 
production and perfect the market system. Local 
governments allocate the resources by controlling all 
kinds of markets. Imperfect market is a representation 
of market failure in agricultural cleaner production. The 
local governments can adopt macroeconomic policies to 
optimize the market’s structures and strengthen its 
functions. In order to realize the efficiency of resource 
allocation, the government may provide financial 
subsidies to the farmers and agricultural products 
processing enterprises for more quantity, lower price 
and competitive power. Besides, the government may 
take the laws to protect the competitive efficiency of the 
market. The thesis mainly discusses how local 
governments’ behaviors can influence factor markets 
for agricultural products and promote cleaner 
production.  
 
1.  DECLARATION AND BASIC 
HYPOTHESIS FOR THE MODELS  
 
Agricultural cleaner production will make great use of 
the resources, improve the environment and ensure the 
products’ security. It also reflects the harmony between 
human and the nature and spirits of coming with the 
times. It is based on new technology and new equipment. 
Therefore, in order to promote agricultural cleaner 
production, local governments should encourage 
farmers to participate in scientific researches and 
develop technological equipments for local places 
according to the actual production situations. 
According to the agricultural mechanism and 
industrial development conditions in China, there are 
three forms for agricultural cleaner production: Type of 
single family, type of production base and type of 
ecological environment protection. The main body of 
single family is the farmer. The farmer is the major 
decision unit for rural economic activities in China and 
controls the agricultural products market. The main 
body of production base is the enterprise. The main 
body of environmental protection includes the farmer, 
enterprise and the local governments. The farmer is the 
basis of developing agricultural cleaner production. The 
thesis mainly discusses how local governments’ 
behavior can influence the factors input in agricultural 
products and the models of promoting agricultural 
cleaner production. The thesis regards the farmer as the 
production main body in primary markets for 
simplification. The products include pollution-free 
agricultural products for energy and water conversation 
in cleaning production and general products. According 
to the reform demands for agricultural fees in China, 
their producers can enjoy the agricultural tax exemption. 
Adjusting farmers’ behaviors subjects to the resources. 
Therefore we will face the decision of factors input with 
the constraint of resources when adjusting farmers’ 
behaviors. With the constraints of capital, land and labor 
and so on, local governments may change the 
production functions to influence the production 
behaviors and promote the course for agricultural 
cleaner production. 
 
1.1  Local governments’ behaviors  
Models for local governments’ behaviors are multiple 
objectives, fuzzy and complicated. Under the condition 
of agricultural fees reduction, the connection for the 
function reformation of local governments and finance 
is the key factor. 
In order to discuss local governments’ behaviors 
based on the factor market, the utility models for local 
governments’ behaviors can be simplified as the 
behavioral target functions in agricultural cleaner 
production: iiii IqpU μ+=
−
, ii qp  is the total 
quantity of agricultural products and concerned by 
governments of all levels for dressing warmly and ear 
people ＇ s fill, Three Agricultural Issues and food 
security. Ii are other aspects that local governments 
concern. μi is the preferential degree between the two 
targets, obviously, whenμi→0, and the quantity of 
agricultural products is preferred, when μi→∞, other 
targets are preferred. Assume the agricultural budget of 
the local government in the place 
is iiii IcqstG +=+ π , G is non-tax revenue of the 
local government, maybe includes central transfer 
payment, off-budget fiscal revenue and so on, itπ is the 
total revenue from the producers, ii cqs  is the subsidies 
for cleaner production enterprises in the beginning, Ii 
are the financial expenditure in other aspects that local 
governments concern. As the decision variables, 
subsidy rate si and financial expenditure Ii will 
maximize the target function.  
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1.2  Farmers’ economic behaviors 
1.2.1  Features for farmers’ economic 
behaviors 
The farmer is a kind of social organization form 
constituted by the kin. According to the response of 
external information, farmers’ economic behaviors 
cover many kinds of behaviors including resources 
organization, agricultural products processing and so on. 
The behaviors should satisfy their material and spiritual 
needs in specific economic environment. Economic 
targets are the farmers’ economic intension for 
production, including three aspects: get basic means of 
livelihood, improve the living conditions, and maximize 
the economic benefits. To fetch the economic benefits is 
the basis of the other two aspects. 
Input behaviors in farmers’ economic activities are 
directly relevant with the production process and output 
(including the products people need and negative effect 
people don’t need). As the “economic man”, farmers 
will maximize the benefits under different constraints. 
They cover the law and regulations, policies, budgets, 
technological conditions of production, price and so on. 
In the economic analysis, we assume benefits 
maximization is farmers’ sole target. Namely, maximize 
the difference between the income and cost. The income 
depends on the price and quantity of the products, the 
cost is decided by the factors’ price and dosage. In order 
to maximize the benefits, farmers’ behaviors will be 
away from welfare maximization of the whole society. 
Therefore, the aim of governments’ behaviors is to 
change the factors that influence farmers’ behaviors and 
uniform the targets of maximizing farmers’ benefits and 
social welfare. 
1.2.2  Factors influencing farmers’ economic 
behaviors 
The farmer is the main body of the market in rural 
economic mechanism of China during the reformation 
period. The rate of products commercialization, 
farmers’ operation behaviors towards the lands and 
technology adoption will be controlled by state’s policy 
and the market mechanism and their own quality.3 
1st.  Directive function of state’s overall policy. 
Since the rural mechanism reform in 1978, though the 
farmers have become the main bodies of productive 
activities in agriculture, their behaviors are influenced 
and controlled by internal and external environments. 
The internal factors include the capital, workers’ quality, 
income level, consumption accumulations and so on. 
The external factors include policy of produces 
circulation, produces investment, lands operation, 
scientific and technological promotion and so on. In 
                                                        
3 Kong Zhifeng. The operation modes research on Chinese 
eco-agriculture, economy and science and technology press, 
2006:219-230(Chinese) 
these policies, policy of state’s investment, price and 
concrete behaviors of the governments will give 
guidance for farmers’ micro-economic behaviors and 
control the total quantity, when regulating the 
macro-economic structure and allocating social 
resources and wealth. 
2nd.  Guidance functions of the market. The motive 
and results of farmers’ economic behaviors, even the 
governments’ intervention policies for economic 
behaviors should consider the market’s status and trend. 
It includes the market processing of agricultural 
products and production materials, agricultural cost, 
operation modes and so on. The market is like an 
invisible hand, playing its role all the time. Many facts 
indicate that the governments’ standards for farmers’ 
economic behaviors and the markets’ orders will come 
into effect when they obey the rules in the markets, or 
the standards fail. Due to the small economic units, the 
desperate farmers are weak in the market. They can’t 
fetch the accurate information. Besides, the information 
of the market at present can only influence the 
agricultural production. The lagged information often 
brings tremendous economic venture to the farmers. 
3rd.  Vital function of farmers’ quality. The farmers 
have been the main bodies in rural economy since 
reform and opening up to the outside world. They have 
their own lands. Further, they can develop key projects, 
professional productions and make decisions according 
to the plans, demands of the agricultural products and 
local resources advantages. However, farmers’ 
capability of decision and usage of agricultural science 
and technology are restricted to the quality of culture, 
science and technology and management and 
administration. For most farmers haven’t read so many 
books, in the production they will invest without 
comprehensive consideration and choose improper 
technology. The economic behaviors will hold back the 
development of agricultural cleaner production. 
 
2.  FACTORS FLOWING RELATIONS OF 
PRODUCTION FACTOR MARKETS FOR 
PRIMARY AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS  
 
2.1  Flowing features of capital factors 
Capital flowing among farmers is to get higher profit 
rate in the existing risk level. Two types of farmers 
attract the capital flow directly and indirectly. The 
indirect forms depend on the financial markets, such as 
household savings flow to some farmers through bank 
credit market and financial institutions in a certain area 
determine the capital flow. Accordingly, the efficiency 
of the financial system determines the cost of capital 
flows. The risk of capital flows is dispersed mainly 
through the screening of financial institutions. The 
direct form is supported by direct investment from large 
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farmers. They will decide the direction of capital flows 
and assume the relevant risks.  
The indirect form is based on the direct investment, 
while the insufficient capital of the investment needs the 
help from financial institutions. On the one hand, 
financial institutions don’t participate in production 
activities directly. They provide finance according to 
the development perspective, financial indices and 
credit conditions. The production and operation 
conditions and credit circumstances will decide whether 
the area can attract capital flows through financial 
system. On the other hand, the formation of direct 
investment needs internal advantages and information 
in the industry, higher adventure preferential level and 
certain initial capital. Indirect investors don’t have the 
conditions. Therefore the investment should be finished 
through the financial system. 4 
Although from an overall perspective, the flow scale 
of the indirect form will be greater. For the local 
governments who try to attract capital flow to the 
agricultural cleaner production, the form of direct 
investment capital will be more meaningful. First, based 
on inherent resources of regional economy, the direct 
investment of the capital can directly promote the 
development process of the regional agricultural cleaner 
production; Second, direct investment will stimulate the 
flow of indirect capital. But the indirect capital flows 
will not affect the new direct investment, and they 
should take the inherent direct investment as the 
foundation. When there is not enough direct investment, 
the accumulation of funds even flow to other areas 
through the financial system; Third, local governments 
have greater power in the direct investments than the 
indirect ones. The local governments control the direct 
investment through tax reduction and cancellation, 
infrastructure improvement, government's efficiency 
promotion and so on. Local governments intervene in 
the indirect capital flows only by restricting bank loans 
and other ways. To control the indirect capital has 
become more difficult in the situation of marketed 
financial institutions gradually.  
 
2.2  Flowing features of land factors 
The lands transformation between two kinds of 
agricultural producers simply depends on the diversity 
of lands production rate in the two kinds of production 
companies. The transformation cost of agricultural 
lands usage represents in the input in technology of 
lands restoration, human and so on. Suppose it as c，
after the transformation of usage direction, the lands 
revenue rate difference is n1-n2 , and all achievable lands 
in local areas is N, then N(n1-n2) ≤ c, the producers 
wouldn’t change the usage direction. Only when 
N(n1-n2)>c, the farmers will change the usage direction, 
                                                        
4 Gong Liutang, Xie Danyang. Provincial difference analyses 
for factor flowing and marginal productivity in China, 
2004(1):45-53 
but n1-n2 depends on the capital flows to a great extent. 
The capital flows subject to local governments’ 
behaviors; therefore the thesis mainly discusses the 
relations between capital factors flow in capital market 
and local governments’ behaviors. 
 
2.3  Flowing features of labor factors 
To see from the rough aspect, actual wage rates 
difference will decide the labor flows among different 
production modes, the labors flow from lower actual 
wage rates to higher ones. From the view of 
approximating reality, nearly all the factors that 
influence individual utility can be the inducement 
factors of labor flow, such as working environment and 
security. The thesis holds that the embodiment of 
farmers’ utility is the difference in revenue rates. 
However, labor transformation needs cost too. The cost 
for labor transformation from the general agricultural 
products processing enterprises to cycle agricultural 
products processing enterprises represents at penalty, 
new post training fees, original chain rupture in the 
society and the difficulty of setting up the new ones. If 
cww ≤− 21 , （ 1w  is the wage rates for cycle 
agricultural products processing enterprises， 2w  is the 
wage rates for traditional agricultural products 
processing enterprises，c is the transformation cost）the 
labors won’t transfer, only when cww >− 21 the 
labors can transfer from the traditional departments to 
the agricultural cleaner production departments. 
Production factors flow interactively. Generally, to see 
from the realistic conditions in agriculture, the capital 
flow can make the lands and labors transfer from one 
department to another. 
 
3.  FACTORS MARKET FOR PRIMARY 
AGRICULTURAL 
PRODUCTS----BEHAVIOR MODELS 
FOR FARMERS 
  
Local governments can attract capital flow to certain 
industries through adjusting the taxes and fees in 
agricultural cleaner production, influencing the capital 
tax coverage. Besides, changing the infrastructures can 
attract the capital too. Under the mechanism of current 
revenue in China, farmers don’t need to pay the fees, no 
matter what the production models are. Therefore, the 
thesis just considers attracting capital flow to 
agricultural cleaner production through improving 
public service. In the thesis, the public service is 
generalized, including: Formulate preferential 
development policy for cleaner production in 
agriculture, establish development information platform 
for cleaner production in agriculture, provide 
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responsible services and set up long-term green 
pollution-free product sales networks and so on.  
 
3.1 Single-element model of primary 
agricultural products market without the 
intervention of local governments  
To facilitate the analysis, suppose the farmers produce 
pollution-free agricultural products and general 
products through two forms of production modes, 
namely, agricultural cleaner production and general 
production. For now in China there are sufficient even 
surplus labors, the production of primary agricultural 
products mainly depends on the lands and capital. The 
price is the exogenous variable. Suppose the farmers’ 
total revenue is: Y ＝ I1+I2 ， (Y is the farmers’ total 
revenue I1 is the profits that the farmers produce 
pollution-free agricultural products, I2 is the profits that 
farmers produce general agricultural products). If all the 
other factors are fixed, only the lands n is variable, then: 
)()( 1211 nnInIy −+=  [ ] [ ])()()()( 1212211111 nncnnqpncnqp −−−+−=
                                                                            （1） 
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If the lands revenue function for pollution-free 
products is linear, the maximazation point for the 
farmers must lie on the boundary point. Namely, 
01 =n ，or nn =1 ，when 01 =n ，farmers’ profit is: 
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AR，AC，AP are the profits, cost and quantity for 
each agricultural unit. 
In the same way, when nn =1 , nARy •= 1  
Therefore, if 12 ARAR f , then 21 yy f ，and 
then at the point of 01 =n , the farmers will use all the 
lands to produce pollution-free products through agricultural cleaner production and maximize the 
profits. 
If 12 ARAR p , then 21 yy p ，and then at the 
point of nn =1 , the farmers will use all the lands to 
produce agricultural products through general  production and maximize the profits. 
If 12 ARAR ≈ , then 21 yy ≈ ，the farmers can 
combine the two production methods of land use freely 
and choose according to their needs and preferences 
variables.[3~5] 
Rural land distribution system in China hasn’t 
formulated the lands for pollution-free products only. 
Farmers’ decisions mainly depend on the comparison of 
per unit lands’ profit margin AR1 and AR2 between 
pollution-free products and general products. Per unit 
lands’ profit margin is decided by products’ price, 
average quantity and cost. To detect from the 
development process of agricultural cleaner production 
in China, the price of general products is lower than that 
of the pollution-free ones’, but the difference is not very 
big. While the average quantity of pollution-free 
products is lower than the general ones’, the average 
cost is higher. So, without the governments’ 
intervention, the promotion of agricultural cleaner 
production will be slow. In order to push on the 
development process of agricultural cleaner production, 
the local governments should explore pollution-free 
products markets, set protective price. Give subsidy to 
farmers according to reduced quantity of chemical 
fertilizers. In this way the average cost can be lowered 
and the average profit rate for each unit will be raised. 
 
3.2 Multi-element model of primary 
agricultural products market with the 
intervention of local governments 
According to Mustsumi Matsumoto’s summary（1998）, 
public service function represents in two ways. The first 
one is the type of factor-augmenting. Its influence to the 
function is ),,(),,( BkLfB
M
k
M
LMf = ，M is the 
numbers of manufactures. In such condition, the 
influence of public service B is similar to A in 
Cobb-Douglas Production Function. The other form is 
the type of firm-augmenting.  Its influence to the 
function is ),,(),,( MBkLfB
M
k
M
LMf = . In such 
condition, the influence of public service B is just like to 
increase one production factor in Cobb-Douglas 
Production Function, but it is still linear homogeneous. 
Use the model above for reference to set up behavior 
model for local governments in primary agricultural 
products with indirect capital flows in factor markets. 
Here, we take the type of factor-augmenting to set up 
the model for local governments according to 
production features of primary agricultural products. 
Suppose the direct production factors of primary 
cycle agricultural products just include the capital and 
lands （K，N），then the function is : 
αα −== 11111 ),,( kABNBNkfq （ A is the 
existing advantages of the area）                     （4） 
First order optimality condition： 
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Here, we just consider the indirect capital flow, 
therefore suppose the marginal profit rate for the capital 
is ( ) trBNKfk +=,,  ， r  is the general profit rate 
for the capital that is decided by the existing total 
quantity under the general equilibrium of consumption 
and accumulation. The agricultural tax rate is t, decided 
by the central government, therefore, r, t is fixed. Then: 
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This means farmers’ profit maximization require the 
capital and lands should be in proportion.  First, suppose 
cnn +< *1 ，it means the lands don’t transfer between 
the two production forms. We assume N as the fixed 
lands for cycle primary agricultural products.  
Realize the profits maximization by adjusting the 
land outputs rates, meanwhile, make the capital flows 
among different departments to satisfy the proportion 
demands of the capital and lands, according to the 
capitals first order optimality condition we can get the 
capital requirements and lands output rate. 
Capital requirements： 
( )( )[ ]αα 111 tABNK +−=            （8） 
Agriculture tax exemption，when t=0， 
( )[ ]αα 11 1−= ABNK                     （9） 
Revenue rate for each unit： 
( )( ) ( )( )[ ]αααα αα 111 1 −− +−= trBAn i       （10）
When t=0 ， ( )( ) ( )[ ]αααα αα 111 −−−= rBAn ii                
（11） 
The capital flow will make the lands transformation; 
it will become the condition for farmers’ profits 
maximization:  
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Namely, local governments’ public service towards 
agricultural cleaner production will help capital flow to 
the industry. And the service is influenced by the 
behavior model for local governments. 
Target function for local governments:  
IqpU ii μ+= ∑−                （13） 
Suppose θ  is the proportion that cycle agricultural 
products account in the gross output, 11 =p ，then the 
target function is: 
IfU μθ +=
−
1                           （14） 
For all the tax for primary agricultural productions is 
dismissed, the constraint for local governments is 
TR=B+I（is the transfer payment of higher authorities，
B is the public service expenditure for cycle cleaner 
production，I is other governmental target expenditures 
for finance） 
Put the constraint condition to the target function, 
the first derivative for B is： 
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kB             （15） 
Get： 
[ ] ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ −= −− αθμα ααα 11
1
1
1 rANB             （16） 
Therefore, in the equilibrium status, the local 
governments’ public service level of agricultural cleaner 
production is influenced by many factors including 
behavior preference、transfer payments、the proportion 
of pollution-free products in total value of out-put、
capital revenue rates 、 elastic coefficient for factor 
income、agricultural lands in the area. If the local 
governments prefer the agricultural cleaner production 
in the area and make the farmers use farm manure, they 
must turn to the public service for help and attract 
capital transformation and inflow. Besides, more capital 
and lands will provide more financial resources for the 
governments in public service. In the initial period of 
agricultural tax exemption and agricultural cleaner 
production, the governments’ public service capability 
is decided by transfer payments to a great extent. 
 
4.  CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
In the agricultural cleaner production, we have studied 
the formation and development of factor markets that 
influenced by the local governments’ behaviors. The 
conclusion is that to encourage direct investment in 
agricultural cleaner production is one of the most 
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effective methods to promote the process for cleaner 
production, increase farmers’ income, transfer the 
surplus labors in rural areas, improve the products’ 
quality and promote sustainable economy development. 
But the governments should take economic methods 
rather than administrative orders to attract direct 
investment. On the one hand, fierce competition will 
help improve the output of the whole industry, provide 
more jobs, and improve consumer surplus and social 
welfare. What’s more, the technology radiation brought 
by the direct investment will lower other farmers’ 
production and operation cost, improve labor 
productivity and products competitive power in the 
agricultural cleaner production. However, on the other 
hand, the spread of the technology and fierce 
competition in the market will lower farmers’ 
knowledge value, investment profits and the enthusiasm 
of farmers’ investment. If the governments don’t pay 
more attention to agricultural cleaner production, the 
industry can’t attract the investment. Therefore, in order 
to attract direct investments in agricultural cleaner 
production, the local governments should take effective 
measures and lower the transaction cost. If the 
technologies are easy to spread, the governments should 
enhance intellectual property protection. Another way 
to attract the direct investments in agricultural cleaner 
production is to expand the demands for cycle means of 
production and green agricultural products. This is good 
for not only the direct investments in agricultural 
cleaner production, but also the environmental 
improvement of the whole rural areas. Form the scaled 
agricultural garden and Production Base，and solve the 
pollution problems of chemical fertilizers、pesticide、
livestock and poultry manure、film、straw. Resource 
agricultural cleaner production emphasizes recycle and 
utilization of agricultural wastes. It encourages 
extending the agricultural ecological chains and 
forming industry network by cooperating with relevant 
industries. Therefore, subjected to the limited natural 
resources in the areas, the resource agricultural cleaner 
production is preferred. 
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